NetBSD Problem Report #58212
From mdehling@gmail.com Sun Apr 28 20:13:09 2024
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Date: Sun, 28 Apr 2024 13:13:05 -0700
From: Malte Dehling <mdehling@gmail.com>
To: GNATS Bugs <gnats-bugs@netbsd.org>
Subject: cgdconfig(8): Add zfs verification method
X-Send-Pr-Version: 3.95
>Number: 58212
>Category: bin
>Synopsis: cgdconfig(8): Add zfs verification method
>Confidential: no
>Severity: non-critical
>Priority: medium
>Responsible: bin-bug-people
>State: closed
>Class: change-request
>Submitter-Id: net
>Arrival-Date: Sun Apr 28 20:15:00 +0000 2024
>Closed-Date: Sat Oct 12 17:05:18 +0000 2024
>Last-Modified: Sat Oct 12 17:05:18 +0000 2024
>Originator: Malte Dehling
>Release: NetBSD 10.0, -current
>Organization:
>Environment:
NetBSD 10.0 (GENERIC) #4: Wed Apr 24 12:21:26 PDT 2024
mdehling@nb-base-dev:/scratch/obj/sys/arch/amd64/compile/GENERIC amd64
>Description:
I would like to propose the attached patch to add a zfs verification
method to the cgdconfig(8) program. With such a method, it will be
possible to use cgd devices as vdevs in a zpool without an intermediate
gpt.
The verification method used here is the same as in fstyp(8): read the
first vdev label (256k at offset 0) and see if vdev_label->vl_vdev_phys
(112k-40b at offset 16k) describes a valid nvlist structure with existing
zpool name property.
>How-To-Repeat:
>Fix:
Make it possible to use cgd devices as vdevs in a zpool without an
intermediate gpt.
---
.../amd64/ramdisks/ramdisk-cgdroot/Makefile | 3 ++
.../amd64/ramdisks/ramdisk-cgdroot/list.zfs | 3 ++
rescue/Makefile | 4 ++
rescue/list.zfs | 3 ++
sbin/cgdconfig/Makefile | 18 +++++++
sbin/cgdconfig/cgdconfig.8 | 2 +
sbin/cgdconfig/cgdconfig.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++
sbin/cgdconfig/params.c | 9 ++++
sbin/cgdconfig/params.h | 1 +
9 files changed, 96 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 distrib/amd64/ramdisks/ramdisk-cgdroot/list.zfs
create mode 100644 rescue/list.zfs
diff --git a/distrib/amd64/ramdisks/ramdisk-cgdroot/Makefile
b/distrib/amd64/ramdisks/ramdisk-cgdroot/Makefile
index 7be7a009f28..75b07c6ebf0 100644
--- a/distrib/amd64/ramdisks/ramdisk-cgdroot/Makefile
+++ b/distrib/amd64/ramdisks/ramdisk-cgdroot/Makefile
@@ -9,6 +9,9 @@ SMALLPROG_INET6=1
.include "${.CURDIR}/../common/Makefile.ramdisk"
LISTS+= ${DISTRIBDIR}/common/list.cgdroot
+.if ${MKZFS} != "no"
+LISTS+= ${.CURDIR}/list.zfs
+.endif
MTREECONF+= ${DISTRIBDIR}/common/mtree.cgdroot
.if ${USE_INET6} != "no"
diff --git a/distrib/amd64/ramdisks/ramdisk-cgdroot/list.zfs
b/distrib/amd64/ramdisks/ramdisk-cgdroot/list.zfs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..8247065d020
--- /dev/null
+++ b/distrib/amd64/ramdisks/ramdisk-cgdroot/list.zfs
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+# $NetBSD$
+
+LIBS -lnvpair
diff --git a/rescue/Makefile b/rescue/Makefile
index 459e8a7135a..6ed6c178f3f 100644
--- a/rescue/Makefile
+++ b/rescue/Makefile
@@ -42,6 +42,10 @@ LISTS+= ${.CURDIR}/list.${f}
LISTS+= ${.CURDIR}/list.inet6
.endif
+.if ${MKZFS} != "no"
+LISTS+= ${.CURDIR}/list.zfs
+.endif
+
LISTS+= ${.CURDIR}/list.crypto
CRUNCHENV+= MKKERBEROS=no # for ssh
diff --git a/rescue/list.zfs b/rescue/list.zfs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..02bf8bc362c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/rescue/list.zfs
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+# $NetBSD$
+
+LIBS -lnvpair
diff --git a/sbin/cgdconfig/Makefile b/sbin/cgdconfig/Makefile
index fec75b4e375..bf1be8109e3 100644
--- a/sbin/cgdconfig/Makefile
+++ b/sbin/cgdconfig/Makefile
@@ -29,4 +29,22 @@ ARGON2_NO_THREADS=1
.include "${NETBSDSRCDIR}/external/apache2/argon2/lib/libargon2/Makefile.inc"
.endif
+.if ${MKZFS} != "no"
+DPADD+= ${LIBNVPAIR}
+LDADD+= -lnvpair
+CPPFLAGS+= -DHAVE_ZFS
+
+OSNET=${NETBSDSRCDIR}/external/cddl/osnet
+CPPFLAGS.cgdconfig.c+= -I${OSNET}/include
+CPPFLAGS.cgdconfig.c+= -I${OSNET}/sys
+CPPFLAGS.cgdconfig.c+= -I${OSNET}/dist/head
+CPPFLAGS.cgdconfig.c+= -I${OSNET}/dist/lib/libzpool/common
+CPPFLAGS.cgdconfig.c+= -I${OSNET}/dist/uts/common
+CPPFLAGS.cgdconfig.c+= -I${OSNET}/dist/uts/common/fs/zfs
+CPPFLAGS.cgdconfig.c+= -I${OSNET}/dist/lib/libnvpair
+
+COPTS.cgdconfig.c+= -Wno-unknown-pragmas
+COPTS.cgdconfig.c+= -Wno-strict-prototypes
+.endif
+
.include <bsd.prog.mk>
diff --git a/sbin/cgdconfig/cgdconfig.8 b/sbin/cgdconfig/cgdconfig.8
index 2b0da2cb732..e48ccde02c5 100644
--- a/sbin/cgdconfig/cgdconfig.8
+++ b/sbin/cgdconfig/cgdconfig.8
@@ -270,6 +270,8 @@ scan for a valid Master Boot Record.
scan for a valid GUID partition table.
.It ffs
scan for a valid FFS file system.
+.It zfs
+scan for a valid ZFS vdev label (if compiled with MKZFS).
.It re-enter
prompt for passphrase twice, and ensure entered passphrases are
identical.
diff --git a/sbin/cgdconfig/cgdconfig.c b/sbin/cgdconfig/cgdconfig.c
index 9a634ef37e2..4baccb1d68f 100644
--- a/sbin/cgdconfig/cgdconfig.c
+++ b/sbin/cgdconfig/cgdconfig.c
@@ -73,6 +73,11 @@ __RCSID("$NetBSD: cgdconfig.c,v 1.61 2022/11/17
06:40:38 chs Exp $");
#include <ufs/ffs/fs.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_ZFS
+#include <libnvpair.h>
+#include <sys/vdev_impl.h>
+#endif
+
#include "params.h"
#include "pkcs5_pbkdf2.h"
#include "utils.h"
@@ -170,6 +175,9 @@ static int verify_ffs(int);
static int verify_reenter(struct params *);
static int verify_mbr(int);
static int verify_gpt(int);
+#ifdef HAVE_ZFS
+static int verify_zfs(int);
+#endif
__dead static void usage(void);
@@ -1024,6 +1032,10 @@ verify(struct params *p, int fd)
return verify_mbr(fd);
case VERIFY_GPT:
return verify_gpt(fd);
+#ifdef HAVE_ZFS
+ case VERIFY_ZFS:
+ return verify_zfs(fd);
+#endif
default:
warnx("unimplemented verification method");
return -1;
@@ -1182,6 +1194,47 @@ verify_gpt(int fd)
return ret;
}
+#ifdef HAVE_ZFS
+static int
+verify_zfs(int fd)
+{
+ vdev_label_t *vdev_label;
+ vdev_phys_t *vdev_phys;
+ nvlist_t *config = NULL;
+ ssize_t ret;
+
+ /*
+ * Read the first ZFS vdev label located at offset 0.
+ */
+ vdev_label = emalloc(sizeof *vdev_label);
+ ret = prog_pread(fd, vdev_label, sizeof(*vdev_label), 0);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ warn("pread");
+ ret = 1;
+ goto bail;
+ } else if ((size_t)ret < sizeof(*vdev_label)) {
+ warnx("pread: incomplete block");
+ ret = 1;
+ goto bail;
+ };
+
+ ret = 0;
+
+ vdev_phys = &(vdev_label->vl_vdev_phys);
+ if ((nvlist_unpack(vdev_phys->vp_nvlist,
+ sizeof(vdev_phys->vp_nvlist), &config, 0)) != 0 ||
+ !nvlist_exists(config, "name"))
+ {
+ ret = 1;
+ };
+
+ nvlist_free(config);
+ bail:
+ free(vdev_label);
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
static off_t sblock_try[] = SBLOCKSEARCH;
static int
diff --git a/sbin/cgdconfig/params.c b/sbin/cgdconfig/params.c
index 91af02c21cc..5da25ec0595 100644
--- a/sbin/cgdconfig/params.c
+++ b/sbin/cgdconfig/params.c
@@ -287,6 +287,10 @@ params_verify_method(string_t *in)
p->verify_method = VERIFY_MBR;
if (!strcmp("gpt", vm))
p->verify_method = VERIFY_GPT;
+#ifdef HAVE_ZFS
+ if (!strcmp("zfs", vm))
+ p->verify_method = VERIFY_ZFS;
+#endif
string_free(in);
@@ -1065,6 +1069,11 @@ params_fput(struct params *p, FILE *f)
case VERIFY_GPT:
print_kvpair_cstr(f, ts, "verify_method", "gpt");
break;
+#ifdef HAVE_ZFS
+ case VERIFY_ZFS:
+ print_kvpair_cstr(f, ts, "verify_method", "zfs");
+ break;
+#endif
default:
warnx("unsupported verify_method (%d)", p->verify_method);
return -1;
diff --git a/sbin/cgdconfig/params.h b/sbin/cgdconfig/params.h
index fb79a0deb80..ef49dde6aba 100644
--- a/sbin/cgdconfig/params.h
+++ b/sbin/cgdconfig/params.h
@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ struct params {
#define VERIFY_REENTER 0x4
#define VERIFY_MBR 0x5
#define VERIFY_GPT 0x6
+#define VERIFY_ZFS 0x7
/* shared key derivation methods */
--
Malte Dehling
>Release-Note:
>Audit-Trail:
From: Taylor R Campbell <riastradh@NetBSD.org>
To: Malte Dehling <mdehling@gmail.com>
Cc: gnats-bugs@NetBSD.org, netbsd-bugs@NetBSD.org
Subject: Re: bin/58212: cgdconfig(8): Add zfs verification method
Date: Sun, 28 Apr 2024 20:38:55 +0000
Cool, thanks! We should definitely have a zfs verification method for
cgdconfig(8). But I think we can do it a little more robustly -- and
with fewer dependencies outside libc in cgdconfig(8).
Here's what I wrote the last time someone suggested this -- identical
to the nvlist approach you adapted from fstyp(8) -- but my round tuit
supply ran short of taking the approach I suggested of verifying a
fixed magic number and a SHA-256 hash over the header:
I wonder if we can do this without pulling so much into cgdconfig and
doing parsing there, though?
A comment in fstyp(8) suggests there's a checksum (which it doesn't
verify); maybe we can use that?
Would be nice if there were a reference to the data format that we can
put in a comment -- which should appear in fstyp(8) too.
Would also be nice if we could quantify the false acceptance
probability under uniform random data (i.e., wrong password, modelling
password hash as uniform random function). For the current
verification methods it looks like:
verify_ffs =3D 1 - (1 - 4/2^32)^4 < one in 250 * 10^6
verify_gpt < 1 - (1 - 1/2^96)^4 < one in 10^28
verify_mbr =3D 1/2^16 (much too high for my comfort!)
For zfs I would hope it can be much lower than for ffs.
I went hunting through the zfs header files and it looks like the vdev
label has a magic number and some kind of 256-bit checksum -- not
specific to the vdev label (other zpool data structures have the same
magic number and checksum), but maybe we can use it:
/* vdev_impl.h */
typedef struct vdev_phys {
char vp_nvlist[VDEV_PHYS_SIZE - sizeof (zio_eck_t)];
zio_eck_t vp_zbt;
} vdev_phys_t;
typedef struct vdev_label {
char vl_pad1[VDEV_PAD_SIZE]; /* 8K */
char vl_pad2[VDEV_PAD_SIZE]; /* 8K */
vdev_phys_t vl_vdev_phys; /* 112K */
char vl_uberblock[VDEV_UBERBLOCK_RING]; /* 128K */
} vdev_label_t; /* 256K tot=
al */
/* zio.h */
#define ZEC_MAGIC 0x210da7ab10c7a11ULL
typedef struct zio_eck {
uint64_t zec_magic; /* for validation, endianness */
zio_cksum_t zec_cksum; /* 256-bit checksum */
} zio_eck_t;
Judging by zio_checksum.c, it looks like it's SHA-256.
I grepped for some of the nvlist keys that zfs uses, and found
libzfs_import.c, which does a couple things:
- Tries not just offset 0, but up to four different offsets with the
label_offset function.
- Checks for "state" and "txg" in the nvlist.
vdev_label_read_config also tries several different offsets, but only
checks for "txg" -- and doesn't even require that. So the nvlist keys
may be a red herring here.
But with the checksum, it looks like we could get by with:
1. (optional) for each possible label offset:
2. verify vl->vl_vdev_phys.vp_zbt.zec_magic =3D=3D ZEC_MAGIC or
byte-swapped, and
3. verify vl->vl_vdev_phys.vp_zbt.zec_cksum is the SHA-256 hash of
whatever part of vl it's computed over.
The SHA-256 hash appears to be calculated over vl->vl_vdev_phys, but
with vp_zbt.zec_cksum set to
{labeloffset + offsetof(struct vdev_label, vl_vdev_phys), 0, 0, 0},
with the 64-bit words possibly encoded in the same byte order as
zec_magic. Except then the bytes of each 64-bit word in the SHA-256
output hash are byte-swapped.
This seems to check out on the one sample I tried, and it should have
a false detection probability under uniform random data well below
1/2^256 which is extremely comfortable. (Should also have low false
detection probability under other formats too because of the checksum
even if you store a file with the magic number in it.)
From: Robert Elz <kre@munnari.OZ.AU>
To: Taylor R Campbell <riastradh@NetBSD.org>
Cc: Malte Dehling <mdehling@gmail.com>, gnats-bugs@NetBSD.org,
netbsd-bugs@NetBSD.org
Subject: Re: bin/58212: cgdconfig(8): Add zfs verification method
Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2024 05:19:05 +0700
Date: Sun, 28 Apr 2024 20:38:55 +0000
From: Taylor R Campbell <riastradh@NetBSD.org>
Message-ID: <20240428203857.A5B9C84D67@mail.netbsd.org>
| A comment in fstyp(8) suggests there's a checksum (which it doesn't
| verify); maybe we can use that?
As long as the checksum is guaranteed to be there (if it is currently
unused, someone might decide not to bother calculating it, one day)
and it is clear over which bytes the checksum is calculated (and
which algorithm to use), that would be fine.
| Would also be nice if we could quantify the false acceptance probability
It doesn't really matter, this has nothing whatever to do with the
security of the cgd, these validity checks are used merely to allow
detection of incorrect passwords (etc) - they (even when they appear
to be validating some data struct) have nothing whatever to do with
use of any of the data.
That is, if the validation method should give a false positive, the
only effect is that when the cgd data is later used, it will effectively
contain rubbish (just as would, say, an uninitialised partition of
a drive) - if the (software) user of the data cannot detect that
the daya is invalid, then it has problems, but they aren't caused
by cgd, it would have the same problems in other uses.
This interpretation is reinforced by the fact that it is possible to
simply disable the verification (command line option), not bother doing
it at all, and everything still works, and is just as secure.
It is nice for the (human) user to be told what the issue is, as
soon as possible (eg: to be told the wrong password has been given)
rather than have some later step complain, but it isn't important.
The 1/2^16 probability that the MBR gives (assuming you're correct
about that, which I don't doubt) is really good enough - the much
higher probabilities against false positivies of the other methods
are nice, I guess, but aren't there because of cgd, they're what
happened to exist anyway.
kre
From: Malte Dehling <mdehling@gmail.com>
To: Taylor R Campbell <riastradh@netbsd.org>
Cc: gnats-bugs@netbsd.org, netbsd-bugs@netbsd.org
Subject: Re: Re: bin/58212: cgdconfig(8): Add zfs verification method
Date: Sun, 28 Apr 2024 16:07:27 -0700
--00000000000069a3400617303387
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
Hi Taylor,
On Sun, Apr 28, 2024 at 08:38:55PM +0000, Taylor R Campbell wrote:
> Cool, thanks! We should definitely have a zfs verification method for
> cgdconfig(8). But I think we can do it a little more robustly -- and
> with fewer dependencies outside libc in cgdconfig(8).
>
> Here's what I wrote the last time someone suggested this -- identical
> to the nvlist approach you adapted from fstyp(8) -- but my round tuit
> supply ran short of taking the approach I suggested of verifying a
> fixed magic number and a SHA-256 hash over the header:
>
> I wonder if we can do this without pulling so much into cgdconfig and
> doing parsing there, though?
>
> A comment in fstyp(8) suggests there's a checksum (which it doesn't
> verify); maybe we can use that?
>
> Would be nice if there were a reference to the data format that we can
> put in a comment -- which should appear in fstyp(8) too.
>
> Would also be nice if we could quantify the false acceptance
> probability under uniform random data (i.e., wrong password, modelling
> password hash as uniform random function). For the current
> verification methods it looks like:
>
> verify_ffs = 1 - (1 - 4/2^32)^4 < one in 250 * 10^6
> verify_gpt < 1 - (1 - 1/2^96)^4 < one in 10^28
> verify_mbr = 1/2^16 (much too high for my comfort!)
>
> For zfs I would hope it can be much lower than for ffs.
>
> I went hunting through the zfs header files and it looks like the vdev
> label has a magic number and some kind of 256-bit checksum -- not
> specific to the vdev label (other zpool data structures have the same
> magic number and checksum), but maybe we can use it:
>
> /* vdev_impl.h */
> typedef struct vdev_phys {
> char vp_nvlist[VDEV_PHYS_SIZE - sizeof (zio_eck_t)];
> zio_eck_t vp_zbt;
> } vdev_phys_t;
>
> typedef struct vdev_label {
> char vl_pad1[VDEV_PAD_SIZE]; /* 8K */
> char vl_pad2[VDEV_PAD_SIZE]; /* 8K */
> vdev_phys_t vl_vdev_phys; /* 112K */
> char vl_uberblock[VDEV_UBERBLOCK_RING]; /* 128K */
> } vdev_label_t; /* 256K total */
>
> /* zio.h */
> #define ZEC_MAGIC 0x210da7ab10c7a11ULL
>
> typedef struct zio_eck {
> uint64_t zec_magic; /* for validation, endianness */
> zio_cksum_t zec_cksum; /* 256-bit checksum */
> } zio_eck_t;
>
> Judging by zio_checksum.c, it looks like it's SHA-256.
>
> I grepped for some of the nvlist keys that zfs uses, and found
> libzfs_import.c, which does a couple things:
>
> - Tries not just offset 0, but up to four different offsets with the
> label_offset function.
>
> - Checks for "state" and "txg" in the nvlist.
>
> vdev_label_read_config also tries several different offsets, but only
> checks for "txg" -- and doesn't even require that. So the nvlist keys
> may be a red herring here.
>
> But with the checksum, it looks like we could get by with:
>
> 1. (optional) for each possible label offset:
>
> 2. verify vl->vl_vdev_phys.vp_zbt.zec_magic == ZEC_MAGIC or
> byte-swapped, and
>
> 3. verify vl->vl_vdev_phys.vp_zbt.zec_cksum is the SHA-256 hash of
> whatever part of vl it's computed over.
>
> The SHA-256 hash appears to be calculated over vl->vl_vdev_phys, but
> with vp_zbt.zec_cksum set to
>
> {labeloffset + offsetof(struct vdev_label, vl_vdev_phys), 0, 0, 0},
>
> with the 64-bit words possibly encoded in the same byte order as
> zec_magic. Except then the bytes of each 64-bit word in the SHA-256
> output hash are byte-swapped.
>
> This seems to check out on the one sample I tried, and it should have
> a false detection probability under uniform random data well below
> 1/2^256 which is extremely comfortable. (Should also have low false
> detection probability under other formats too because of the checksum
> even if you store a file with the magic number in it.)
Thanks for the detailed response!
I did the same reading to try and find out if there is a simple checksum
verification function but didn't find anything. It seems like zpool
import never actually verifies the checksums or magic bytes in
vl->vl_vdev_phys->vp_zbt . There are VDEV_LABELS (4) labels, two at the
beginning of the disk (offset 0 and 256k) and two at the end (at -512k,
-256k) and even with all of their vl->vl_vdev_phys->vp_zbt structures
zeroed out, zpool import shows no complaints. The checksums are updated
on export.
I did a quick test and computed sha256 for vl->vdev_phys and it works as
you described: the magic bytes need to be set first (byte-swapped on my
system) and the offset encoded in the first of the 64bit checksum words
(also byte-swapped). The computed sha256 checksum is then stored as 4
64bit words in byte-swapped order.
Implementing the checksum verification is easy and allows us to get rid
of the libnvpair dependency, so I don't mind implementing it that way.
Since I haven't looked into exactly how much checking libnvpair does, I
don't know what the risk of false positives for the current proposal is.
Cheers,
--
Malte Dehling
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V1B3QwpoQ28zeHJVQlNyU1FUVzdwWVZhcVBnRysybXAycXlxdzk5d1I3WHJ2N1Q3SVBPV1NDUzg9
Cj1YZ092Ci0tLS0tRU5EIFBHUCBTSUdOQVRVUkUtLS0tLQo=
--00000000000069a3400617303387--
From: Taylor R Campbell <riastradh@NetBSD.org>
To: Robert Elz <kre@munnari.OZ.AU>
Cc: Malte Dehling <mdehling@gmail.com>, gnats-bugs@NetBSD.org, netbsd-bugs@NetBSD.org
Subject: Re: bin/58212: cgdconfig(8): Add zfs verification method
Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2024 01:54:21 +0000
> Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2024 05:19:05 +0700
> From: Robert Elz <kre@munnari.OZ.AU>
>=20
> | Would also be nice if we could quantify the false acceptance probabil=
ity
>=20
> It doesn't really matter, this has nothing whatever to do with the
> security of the cgd, these validity checks are used merely to allow
> detection of incorrect passwords (etc) - they (even when they appear
> to be validating some data struct) have nothing whatever to do with
> use of any of the data.
You're right that it's not relevant to the security of cgd's
confidentiality against an adversary, but it does matter to users.
Seeing `verification failed, please reenter passphrase' is unalarming.
Seeing a host of fsck failures at boot time because the block device
is garbage when decrypted with the wrong key is extremely alarming,
and suggests you have faulty hardware and may have lost data.
And if you do anything to write data back to the block device -- e.g.,
you decide to give up on data recovery and newfs it -- you'll probably
never get your _new_ data back because you have to make the same typo
when you next boot.
> The 1/2^16 probability that the MBR gives (assuming you're correct
> about that, which I don't doubt)
For those curious, this came by modelling the plaintext under the
wrong key as independent uniform random bits, under which the
verify_mbr criterion of checking for a single 16-bit magic number has
probability 1/2^16 of passing:
https://nxr.netbsd.org/xref/src/sbin/cgdconfig/cgdconfig.c?r=3D1.62#1058
1070 ret =3D prog_pread(fd, buf, SCANSIZE, 0);
1071 if (ret < 0) {
1072 warn("can't read mbr area");
1073 return -1;
1074 }
1075=20
1076 memcpy(&mbr, buf, sizeof(mbr));
1077 if (le16toh(mbr.mbr_magic) !=3D MBR_MAGIC)
1078 return 1;
1079=20
1080 return 0;
The verify_ffs criterion is a little more involved, and since I wrote
the previous message (a couple years ago) it has grown a higher false
acceptance probability now that it allows FS_UFS2EA_MAGIC or
FS_UFS2EA_MAGIC_SWAPPED too, so it's 1 - (1 - 6/2^32)^4 or a little
under one in 178 * 10^6. This arises from allowing any of six
different 32-bit magic numbers in any of four different superblock
locations.
https://nxr.netbsd.org/xref/src/sbin/cgdconfig/cgdconfig.c?r=3D1.62#1185
https://nxr.netbsd.org/xref/src/sys/ufs/ffs/fs.h?r=3D1.71#103
> is really good enough - the much
> higher probabilities against false positivies of the other methods
> are nice, I guess, but aren't there because of cgd, they're what
> happened to exist anyway.
The independent uniform random bits model is substantively different
from usual hardware errors, where typically we model each bit as
having an independent small (not fair coin toss) probability of error,
or a burst of errors in a nearby region. And human-designed data
formats tend not to be totally randomized. So this really is related
to cgd and not just to the reliability of the MBR magic number in
non-randomized applications.
For a sense of scale, suppose there are 1000 users, and over the
course of time, each of them types a wrong password 50 times with the
verify_mbr method.
In this scenario, there's better than a coin toss's odds in this
scenario that one of those wrong password entries will be accepted,
leading to alarming consequences when the resulting disk is full of
gibberish.
Maybe that's an optimistic estimate of the number of cgd(4) users, or
a pessimistic estimate of their typing ability, but it's not _that_
optimistic or pessimistic. (I'm sure I've typed my password wrong
more than 50 times.)
From: Malte Dehling <mdehling@gmail.com>
To: netbsd-bugs@netbsd.org
Cc: Taylor R Campbell <riastradh@netbsd.org>, gnats-bugs@netbsd.org
Subject: Re: Re: Re: bin/58212: cgdconfig(8): Add zfs verification method
Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2024 18:46:11 -0700
Hi,
On Sun, Apr 28, 2024 at 01:13:05PM -0700, Malte Dehling wrote:
> >Submitter-Id: net
> >Originator: Malte Dehling
> >Organization:
> >Confidential: no
> >Synopsis: cgdconfig(8): Add zfs verification method
> >Severity: non-critical
> >Priority: medium
> >Category: bin
> >Class: change-request
> >Release: NetBSD 10.0, -current
> >Environment:
> NetBSD 10.0 (GENERIC) #4: Wed Apr 24 12:21:26 PDT 2024
> mdehling@nb-base-dev:/scratch/obj/sys/arch/amd64/compile/GENERIC amd64
>
> >Description:
> I would like to propose the attached patch to add a zfs verification
> method to the cgdconfig(8) program. With such a method, it will be
> possible to use cgd devices as vdevs in a zpool without an intermediate
> gpt.
How about this version instead?
I _think_ I got the byte order logic right:
- deduce the byte order from the magic bytes and use it to initialize
the checksum computation with the same byte order
- on-disk sha256 is always stored in big-endian order, so convert
whatever we compute to BE before comparing
Tested only on LE since I don't have a BE netbsd system handy right now.
---
Implement vdev label checksum verification. Allows using raw cgd
devices as vdevs in a zpool.
---
sbin/cgdconfig/Makefile | 15 +++++
sbin/cgdconfig/cgdconfig.8 | 2 +
sbin/cgdconfig/cgdconfig.c | 111 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
sbin/cgdconfig/params.c | 9 +++
sbin/cgdconfig/params.h | 1 +
5 files changed, 138 insertions(+)
diff --git a/sbin/cgdconfig/Makefile b/sbin/cgdconfig/Makefile
index fec75b4e375..0ed669ab738 100644
--- a/sbin/cgdconfig/Makefile
+++ b/sbin/cgdconfig/Makefile
@@ -29,4 +29,19 @@ ARGON2_NO_THREADS=1
.include "${NETBSDSRCDIR}/external/apache2/argon2/lib/libargon2/Makefile.inc"
.endif
+.if ${MKZFS} != "no"
+CPPFLAGS+= -DHAVE_ZFS
+
+OSNET=${NETBSDSRCDIR}/external/cddl/osnet
+CPPFLAGS.cgdconfig.c+= -I${OSNET}/include
+CPPFLAGS.cgdconfig.c+= -I${OSNET}/sys
+CPPFLAGS.cgdconfig.c+= -I${OSNET}/dist/head
+CPPFLAGS.cgdconfig.c+= -I${OSNET}/dist/lib/libzpool/common
+CPPFLAGS.cgdconfig.c+= -I${OSNET}/dist/uts/common
+CPPFLAGS.cgdconfig.c+= -I${OSNET}/dist/uts/common/fs/zfs
+
+COPTS.cgdconfig.c+= -Wno-unknown-pragmas
+COPTS.cgdconfig.c+= -Wno-strict-prototypes
+.endif
+
.include <bsd.prog.mk>
diff --git a/sbin/cgdconfig/cgdconfig.8 b/sbin/cgdconfig/cgdconfig.8
index 2b0da2cb732..e48ccde02c5 100644
--- a/sbin/cgdconfig/cgdconfig.8
+++ b/sbin/cgdconfig/cgdconfig.8
@@ -270,6 +270,8 @@ scan for a valid Master Boot Record.
scan for a valid GUID partition table.
.It ffs
scan for a valid FFS file system.
+.It zfs
+scan for a valid ZFS vdev label (if compiled with MKZFS).
.It re-enter
prompt for passphrase twice, and ensure entered passphrases are
identical.
diff --git a/sbin/cgdconfig/cgdconfig.c b/sbin/cgdconfig/cgdconfig.c
index 9a634ef37e2..de4d09013bf 100644
--- a/sbin/cgdconfig/cgdconfig.c
+++ b/sbin/cgdconfig/cgdconfig.c
@@ -73,6 +73,11 @@ __RCSID("$NetBSD: cgdconfig.c,v 1.61 2022/11/17
06:40:38 chs Exp $");
#include <ufs/ffs/fs.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_ZFS
+#include <sys/vdev_impl.h>
+#include <sha2.h>
+#endif
+
#include "params.h"
#include "pkcs5_pbkdf2.h"
#include "utils.h"
@@ -170,6 +175,9 @@ static int verify_ffs(int);
static int verify_reenter(struct params *);
static int verify_mbr(int);
static int verify_gpt(int);
+#ifdef HAVE_ZFS
+static int verify_zfs(int);
+#endif
__dead static void usage(void);
@@ -1024,6 +1032,10 @@ verify(struct params *p, int fd)
return verify_mbr(fd);
case VERIFY_GPT:
return verify_gpt(fd);
+#ifdef HAVE_ZFS
+ case VERIFY_ZFS:
+ return verify_zfs(fd);
+#endif
default:
warnx("unimplemented verification method");
return -1;
@@ -1182,6 +1194,105 @@ verify_gpt(int fd)
return ret;
}
+#ifdef HAVE_ZFS
+
+#define ZIO_CHECKSUM_BE(zcp) \
+{ \
+ (zcp)->zc_word[0] = BE_64((zcp)->zc_word[0]); \
+ (zcp)->zc_word[1] = BE_64((zcp)->zc_word[1]); \
+ (zcp)->zc_word[2] = BE_64((zcp)->zc_word[2]); \
+ (zcp)->zc_word[3] = BE_64((zcp)->zc_word[3]); \
+}
+
+static int
+verify_zfs(int fd)
+{
+ struct stat sb;
+ vdev_phys_t *vdev_phys;
+ off_t vdev_phys_off;
+ ssize_t ret;
+ bool byteswap;
+ zio_cksum_t cksum_found, cksum_real;
+ SHA256_CTX ctx;
+
+ if (fstat(fd, &sb)) {
+ warn("fstat");
+ return 1;
+ } else if (sb.st_size == 0) {
+ warnx("fstat returned size zero");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ vdev_phys = emalloc(sizeof *vdev_phys);
+ for (int l = 0; l < VDEV_LABELS; l++) {
+ vdev_phys_off = ( l < VDEV_LABELS/2 ?
+ l * sizeof(vdev_label_t) :
+ sb.st_size - (VDEV_LABELS-l) * sizeof(vdev_label_t) ) \
+ + offsetof(vdev_label_t, vl_vdev_phys);
+
+ ret = prog_pread(fd, vdev_phys, sizeof *vdev_phys,
+ vdev_phys_off);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ warn("pread");
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+ } else if ((size_t)ret < sizeof *vdev_phys) {
+ warnx("pread: incomplete block");
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+
+ if (vdev_phys->vp_zbt.zec_magic == BSWAP_64(ZEC_MAGIC))
+ byteswap = true;
+ else if (vdev_phys->vp_zbt.zec_magic == ZEC_MAGIC)
+ byteswap = false;
+ else {
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+ };
+
+ cksum_found = vdev_phys->vp_zbt.zec_cksum;
+
+ ZIO_SET_CHECKSUM(&vdev_phys->vp_zbt.zec_cksum,
+ vdev_phys_off, 0, 0, 0);
+ if (byteswap)
+ ZIO_CHECKSUM_BSWAP(&vdev_phys->vp_zbt.zec_cksum);
+
+ SHA256Init(&ctx);
+ SHA256Update(&ctx, (uint8_t *)vdev_phys, sizeof *vdev_phys);
+ SHA256Final(&cksum_real, &ctx);
+
+ /*
+ * For historical reasons the on-disk sha256 checksums are
+ * always in big endian format.
+ * (see cddl/osnet/dist/uts/common/fs/zfs/sha256.c)
+ */
+ ZIO_CHECKSUM_BE(&cksum_real);
+
+ if (!ZIO_CHECKSUM_EQUAL(cksum_found, cksum_real)) {
+ warnx("checksum mismatch on vdev label %d", l);
+ warnx("found %lx, %lx, %lx, %lx",
+ (unsigned long)cksum_found.zc_word[0],
+ (unsigned long)cksum_found.zc_word[1],
+ (unsigned long)cksum_found.zc_word[2],
+ (unsigned long)cksum_found.zc_word[3]);
+ warnx("expected %lx, %lx, %lx, %lx",
+ (unsigned long)cksum_real.zc_word[0],
+ (unsigned long)cksum_real.zc_word[1],
+ (unsigned long)cksum_real.zc_word[2],
+ (unsigned long)cksum_real.zc_word[3]);
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ free(vdev_phys);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#endif
+
static off_t sblock_try[] = SBLOCKSEARCH;
static int
diff --git a/sbin/cgdconfig/params.c b/sbin/cgdconfig/params.c
index 91af02c21cc..5da25ec0595 100644
--- a/sbin/cgdconfig/params.c
+++ b/sbin/cgdconfig/params.c
@@ -287,6 +287,10 @@ params_verify_method(string_t *in)
p->verify_method = VERIFY_MBR;
if (!strcmp("gpt", vm))
p->verify_method = VERIFY_GPT;
+#ifdef HAVE_ZFS
+ if (!strcmp("zfs", vm))
+ p->verify_method = VERIFY_ZFS;
+#endif
string_free(in);
@@ -1065,6 +1069,11 @@ params_fput(struct params *p, FILE *f)
case VERIFY_GPT:
print_kvpair_cstr(f, ts, "verify_method", "gpt");
break;
+#ifdef HAVE_ZFS
+ case VERIFY_ZFS:
+ print_kvpair_cstr(f, ts, "verify_method", "zfs");
+ break;
+#endif
default:
warnx("unsupported verify_method (%d)", p->verify_method);
return -1;
diff --git a/sbin/cgdconfig/params.h b/sbin/cgdconfig/params.h
index fb79a0deb80..ef49dde6aba 100644
--- a/sbin/cgdconfig/params.h
+++ b/sbin/cgdconfig/params.h
@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ struct params {
#define VERIFY_REENTER 0x4
#define VERIFY_MBR 0x5
#define VERIFY_GPT 0x6
+#define VERIFY_ZFS 0x7
/* shared key derivation methods */
--
2.44.0
Cheers,
--
Malte Dehling
From: Malte Dehling <mdehling@gmail.com>
To: netbsd-bugs@netbsd.org
Cc: Taylor R Campbell <riastradh@netbsd.org>, gnats-bugs@netbsd.org
Subject: Re: Re: Re: Re: bin/58212: cgdconfig(8): Add zfs verification method
Date: Sat, 4 May 2024 18:42:57 -0400
Hi again,
On Mon, Apr 29, 2024 at 02:59:05PM -0700, Malte Dehling wrote:
> On Sun, Apr 28, 2024 at 01:13:05PM -0700, Malte Dehling wrote:
> > >Submitter-Id: net
> > >Originator: Malte Dehling
> > >Organization:
> > >Confidential: no
> > >Synopsis: cgdconfig(8): Add zfs verification method
> > >Severity: non-critical
> > >Priority: medium
> > >Category: bin
> > >Class: change-request
> > >Release: NetBSD 10.0, -current
> > >Environment:
> > NetBSD 10.0 (GENERIC) #4: Wed Apr 24 12:21:26 PDT 2024
> > mdehling@nb-base-dev:/scratch/obj/sys/arch/amd64/compile/GENERIC amd64
> >
> > >Description:
> > I would like to propose the attached patch to add a zfs verification
> > method to the cgdconfig(8) program. With such a method, it will be
> > possible to use cgd devices as vdevs in a zpool without an intermediate
> > gpt.
>
> How about this version instead?
>
> I _think_ I got the byte order logic right:
> - deduce the byte order from the magic bytes and use it to initialize
> the checksum computation with the same byte order
> - on-disk sha256 is always stored in big-endian order, so convert
> whatever we compute to BE before comparing
>
> Tested only on LE since I don't have a BE netbsd system handy right now.
Here's an updated version of the patch.
I fixed two issues:
- my attempt to read the vdev size using fstat didn't work, so instead
this uses ioctl(fd, DIOCGMEDIASIZE, &vdev_size)
- the checksum is now correctly byte-swapped based on the endianness of
the magic number
I've tested this version on amd64 (LE) and aarch64be (BE) separately,
and by passing zpool on cgd disk images between them.
---
Implement vdev label checksum verification. Allows using raw cgd
devices as vdevs in a zpool.
---
sbin/cgdconfig/Makefile | 15 +++++
sbin/cgdconfig/cgdconfig.8 | 2 +
sbin/cgdconfig/cgdconfig.c | 109 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
sbin/cgdconfig/params.c | 9 +++
sbin/cgdconfig/params.h | 1 +
5 files changed, 136 insertions(+)
diff --git a/sbin/cgdconfig/Makefile b/sbin/cgdconfig/Makefile
index fec75b4e375..0ed669ab738 100644
--- a/sbin/cgdconfig/Makefile
+++ b/sbin/cgdconfig/Makefile
@@ -29,4 +29,19 @@ ARGON2_NO_THREADS=1
.include "${NETBSDSRCDIR}/external/apache2/argon2/lib/libargon2/Makefile.inc"
.endif
+.if ${MKZFS} != "no"
+CPPFLAGS+= -DHAVE_ZFS
+
+OSNET=${NETBSDSRCDIR}/external/cddl/osnet
+CPPFLAGS.cgdconfig.c+= -I${OSNET}/include
+CPPFLAGS.cgdconfig.c+= -I${OSNET}/sys
+CPPFLAGS.cgdconfig.c+= -I${OSNET}/dist/head
+CPPFLAGS.cgdconfig.c+= -I${OSNET}/dist/lib/libzpool/common
+CPPFLAGS.cgdconfig.c+= -I${OSNET}/dist/uts/common
+CPPFLAGS.cgdconfig.c+= -I${OSNET}/dist/uts/common/fs/zfs
+
+COPTS.cgdconfig.c+= -Wno-unknown-pragmas
+COPTS.cgdconfig.c+= -Wno-strict-prototypes
+.endif
+
.include <bsd.prog.mk>
diff --git a/sbin/cgdconfig/cgdconfig.8 b/sbin/cgdconfig/cgdconfig.8
index 2b0da2cb732..e48ccde02c5 100644
--- a/sbin/cgdconfig/cgdconfig.8
+++ b/sbin/cgdconfig/cgdconfig.8
@@ -270,6 +270,8 @@ scan for a valid Master Boot Record.
scan for a valid GUID partition table.
.It ffs
scan for a valid FFS file system.
+.It zfs
+scan for a valid ZFS vdev label (if compiled with MKZFS).
.It re-enter
prompt for passphrase twice, and ensure entered passphrases are
identical.
diff --git a/sbin/cgdconfig/cgdconfig.c b/sbin/cgdconfig/cgdconfig.c
index 9a634ef37e2..fe2c394b821 100644
--- a/sbin/cgdconfig/cgdconfig.c
+++ b/sbin/cgdconfig/cgdconfig.c
@@ -73,6 +73,11 @@ __RCSID("$NetBSD: cgdconfig.c,v 1.61 2022/11/17
06:40:38 chs Exp $");
#include <ufs/ffs/fs.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_ZFS
+#include <sys/vdev_impl.h>
+#include <sha2.h>
+#endif
+
#include "params.h"
#include "pkcs5_pbkdf2.h"
#include "utils.h"
@@ -170,6 +175,9 @@ static int verify_ffs(int);
static int verify_reenter(struct params *);
static int verify_mbr(int);
static int verify_gpt(int);
+#ifdef HAVE_ZFS
+static int verify_zfs(int);
+#endif
__dead static void usage(void);
@@ -1024,6 +1032,10 @@ verify(struct params *p, int fd)
return verify_mbr(fd);
case VERIFY_GPT:
return verify_gpt(fd);
+#ifdef HAVE_ZFS
+ case VERIFY_ZFS:
+ return verify_zfs(fd);
+#endif
default:
warnx("unimplemented verification method");
return -1;
@@ -1182,6 +1194,103 @@ verify_gpt(int fd)
return ret;
}
+#ifdef HAVE_ZFS
+
+#define ZIO_CHECKSUM_BE(zcp) \
+{ \
+ (zcp)->zc_word[0] = BE_64((zcp)->zc_word[0]); \
+ (zcp)->zc_word[1] = BE_64((zcp)->zc_word[1]); \
+ (zcp)->zc_word[2] = BE_64((zcp)->zc_word[2]); \
+ (zcp)->zc_word[3] = BE_64((zcp)->zc_word[3]); \
+}
+
+static int
+verify_zfs(int fd)
+{
+ vdev_phys_t *vdev_phys;
+ off_t vdev_size, vdev_phys_off;
+ ssize_t ret;
+ bool byteswap;
+ zio_cksum_t cksum_found, cksum_real;
+ SHA256_CTX ctx;
+
+ if (prog_ioctl(fd, DIOCGMEDIASIZE, &vdev_size) == -1) {
+ warn("ioctl");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ vdev_phys = emalloc(sizeof *vdev_phys);
+ for (int l = 0; l < VDEV_LABELS; l++) {
+ vdev_phys_off = ( l < VDEV_LABELS/2 ?
+ l * sizeof(vdev_label_t) :
+ vdev_size - (VDEV_LABELS-l) * sizeof(vdev_label_t) ) \
+ + offsetof(vdev_label_t, vl_vdev_phys);
+
+ ret = prog_pread(fd, vdev_phys, sizeof *vdev_phys,
+ vdev_phys_off);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ warn("pread");
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+ } else if ((size_t)ret < sizeof *vdev_phys) {
+ warnx("pread: incomplete block");
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+
+ if (vdev_phys->vp_zbt.zec_magic == BSWAP_64(ZEC_MAGIC))
+ byteswap = true;
+ else if (vdev_phys->vp_zbt.zec_magic == ZEC_MAGIC)
+ byteswap = false;
+ else {
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+ };
+
+ cksum_found = vdev_phys->vp_zbt.zec_cksum;
+ if (byteswap)
+ ZIO_CHECKSUM_BSWAP(&cksum_found);
+
+ ZIO_SET_CHECKSUM(&vdev_phys->vp_zbt.zec_cksum,
+ vdev_phys_off, 0, 0, 0);
+ if (byteswap)
+ ZIO_CHECKSUM_BSWAP(&vdev_phys->vp_zbt.zec_cksum);
+
+ SHA256Init(&ctx);
+ SHA256Update(&ctx, (uint8_t *)vdev_phys, sizeof *vdev_phys);
+ SHA256Final(&cksum_real, &ctx);
+
+ /*
+ * For historical reasons the on-disk sha256 checksums are
+ * always in big endian format.
+ * (see cddl/osnet/dist/uts/common/fs/zfs/sha256.c)
+ */
+ ZIO_CHECKSUM_BE(&cksum_real);
+
+ if (!ZIO_CHECKSUM_EQUAL(cksum_found, cksum_real)) {
+ warnx("checksum mismatch on vdev label %d", l);
+ warnx("found %lx, %lx, %lx, %lx",
+ (unsigned long)cksum_found.zc_word[0],
+ (unsigned long)cksum_found.zc_word[1],
+ (unsigned long)cksum_found.zc_word[2],
+ (unsigned long)cksum_found.zc_word[3]);
+ warnx("expected %lx, %lx, %lx, %lx",
+ (unsigned long)cksum_real.zc_word[0],
+ (unsigned long)cksum_real.zc_word[1],
+ (unsigned long)cksum_real.zc_word[2],
+ (unsigned long)cksum_real.zc_word[3]);
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ free(vdev_phys);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#endif
+
static off_t sblock_try[] = SBLOCKSEARCH;
static int
diff --git a/sbin/cgdconfig/params.c b/sbin/cgdconfig/params.c
index 91af02c21cc..5da25ec0595 100644
--- a/sbin/cgdconfig/params.c
+++ b/sbin/cgdconfig/params.c
@@ -287,6 +287,10 @@ params_verify_method(string_t *in)
p->verify_method = VERIFY_MBR;
if (!strcmp("gpt", vm))
p->verify_method = VERIFY_GPT;
+#ifdef HAVE_ZFS
+ if (!strcmp("zfs", vm))
+ p->verify_method = VERIFY_ZFS;
+#endif
string_free(in);
@@ -1065,6 +1069,11 @@ params_fput(struct params *p, FILE *f)
case VERIFY_GPT:
print_kvpair_cstr(f, ts, "verify_method", "gpt");
break;
+#ifdef HAVE_ZFS
+ case VERIFY_ZFS:
+ print_kvpair_cstr(f, ts, "verify_method", "zfs");
+ break;
+#endif
default:
warnx("unsupported verify_method (%d)", p->verify_method);
return -1;
diff --git a/sbin/cgdconfig/params.h b/sbin/cgdconfig/params.h
index fb79a0deb80..ef49dde6aba 100644
--- a/sbin/cgdconfig/params.h
+++ b/sbin/cgdconfig/params.h
@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ struct params {
#define VERIFY_REENTER 0x4
#define VERIFY_MBR 0x5
#define VERIFY_GPT 0x6
+#define VERIFY_ZFS 0x7
/* shared key derivation methods */
--
2.44.0
--
Malte Dehling
From: "Christos Zoulas" <christos@netbsd.org>
To: gnats-bugs@gnats.NetBSD.org
Cc:
Subject: PR/58212 CVS commit: src/sbin/cgdconfig
Date: Sun, 12 May 2024 14:02:16 -0400
Module Name: src
Committed By: christos
Date: Sun May 12 18:02:16 UTC 2024
Modified Files:
src/sbin/cgdconfig: Makefile cgdconfig.8 cgdconfig.c params.c params.h
Log Message:
PR/58212: Malte Dehling: Add zfs verification method
To generate a diff of this commit:
cvs rdiff -u -r1.22 -r1.23 src/sbin/cgdconfig/Makefile
cvs rdiff -u -r1.57 -r1.58 src/sbin/cgdconfig/cgdconfig.8
cvs rdiff -u -r1.62 -r1.63 src/sbin/cgdconfig/cgdconfig.c
cvs rdiff -u -r1.34 -r1.35 src/sbin/cgdconfig/params.c
cvs rdiff -u -r1.14 -r1.15 src/sbin/cgdconfig/params.h
Please note that diffs are not public domain; they are subject to the
copyright notices on the relevant files.
State-Changed-From-To: open->needs-pullups
State-Changed-By: riastradh@NetBSD.org
State-Changed-When: Tue, 23 Jul 2024 21:53:03 +0000
State-Changed-Why:
Thanks for the patch! Committed to HEAD, needs pullup-10 and pullup-9.
(We should also put the false accept probabilities in the man page.)
From: "Taylor R Campbell" <riastradh@netbsd.org>
To: gnats-bugs@gnats.NetBSD.org
Cc:
Subject: PR/58212 CVS commit: src/sbin/cgdconfig
Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2024 19:44:17 +0000
Module Name: src
Committed By: riastradh
Date: Wed Oct 9 19:44:17 UTC 2024
Modified Files:
src/sbin/cgdconfig: cgdconfig.8
Log Message:
cgdconfig(8): Estimate verify methods' false accept probabilities.
An addendum following discussion around:
PR bin/58212: cgdconfig(8): Add zfs verification method
To generate a diff of this commit:
cvs rdiff -u -r1.58 -r1.59 src/sbin/cgdconfig/cgdconfig.8
Please note that diffs are not public domain; they are subject to the
copyright notices on the relevant files.
State-Changed-From-To: needs-pullups->pending-pullups
State-Changed-By: riastradh@NetBSD.org
State-Changed-When: Thu, 10 Oct 2024 21:52:03 +0000
State-Changed-Why:
pullup-10 #941 https://releng.netbsd.org/cgi-bin/req-10.cgi?show=941
(not going to pull this up to 9)
From: "Martin Husemann" <martin@netbsd.org>
To: gnats-bugs@gnats.NetBSD.org
Cc:
Subject: PR/58212 CVS commit: [netbsd-10] src/sbin/cgdconfig
Date: Fri, 11 Oct 2024 08:54:39 +0000
Module Name: src
Committed By: martin
Date: Fri Oct 11 08:54:39 UTC 2024
Modified Files:
src/sbin/cgdconfig [netbsd-10]: Makefile cgdconfig.8 cgdconfig.c
params.c params.h
Log Message:
Pull up following revision(s) (requested by riastradh in ticket #941):
sbin/cgdconfig/params.c: revision 1.35
sbin/cgdconfig/params.h: revision 1.15
sbin/cgdconfig/cgdconfig.c: revision 1.62
sbin/cgdconfig/cgdconfig.c: revision 1.63
sbin/cgdconfig/cgdconfig.8: revision 1.58
sbin/cgdconfig/cgdconfig.8: revision 1.59
sbin/cgdconfig/Makefile: revision 1.23
cgdconfig(8): KNF in cgdconfig.c.
No functional change intended.
PR/58212: Malte Dehling: Add zfs verification method
cgdconfig(8): Estimate verify methods' false accept probabilities.
An addendum following discussion around:
PR bin/58212: cgdconfig(8): Add zfs verification method
To generate a diff of this commit:
cvs rdiff -u -r1.22 -r1.22.2.1 src/sbin/cgdconfig/Makefile
cvs rdiff -u -r1.57 -r1.57.2.1 src/sbin/cgdconfig/cgdconfig.8
cvs rdiff -u -r1.61 -r1.61.2.1 src/sbin/cgdconfig/cgdconfig.c
cvs rdiff -u -r1.34 -r1.34.2.1 src/sbin/cgdconfig/params.c
cvs rdiff -u -r1.14 -r1.14.2.1 src/sbin/cgdconfig/params.h
Please note that diffs are not public domain; they are subject to the
copyright notices on the relevant files.
State-Changed-From-To: pending-pullups->closed
State-Changed-By: riastradh@NetBSD.org
State-Changed-When: Sat, 12 Oct 2024 17:05:18 +0000
State-Changed-Why:
fixed in HEAD, pulled up to 10, not gonna happen <10
>Unformatted:
(Contact us)
$NetBSD: query-full-pr,v 1.47 2022/09/11 19:34:41 kim Exp $
$NetBSD: gnats_config.sh,v 1.9 2014/08/02 14:16:04 spz Exp $
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