NetBSD Problem Report #9528

Received: (qmail 15318 invoked from network); 4 Mar 2000 02:00:59 -0000
Message-Id: <200003040200.VAA01734@nyarlathotep.old-ones.com>
Date: Fri, 3 Mar 2000 21:00:57 -0500 (EST)
From: Bill Squier <groo@old-ones.com>
Reply-To: groo@old-ones.com
To: gnats-bugs@gnats.netbsd.org
Subject: xterm vulnerable to root exploit
X-Send-Pr-Version: 3.95

>Number:         9528
>Category:       security
>Synopsis:       xterm vulnerable to root exploit
>Confidential:   no
>Severity:       serious
>Priority:       medium
>Responsible:    tron
>State:          closed
>Class:          sw-bug
>Submitter-Id:   net
>Arrival-Date:   Fri Mar 03 18:03:00 +0000 2000
>Closed-Date:    Fri May 26 07:20:06 +0000 2000
>Last-Modified:  Sun Dec 17 13:32:26 +0000 2000
>Originator:     Bill Squier
>Release:        
>Organization:
Bill Squier (groo@cs.stevens-tech.edu)
http://www.cs.stevens-tech.edu/~groo
>Environment:

System: NetBSD nyarlathotep 1.4 NetBSD 1.4 (NYARLATHOTEP) #10: Wed Dec 15 20:43:55 EST 1999 groo@nyarlathotep:/sysn/arch/i386/compile/NYARLATHOTEP i386


>Description:

Forwarded message, from BUGTRAQ:

---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Tue, 29 Feb 2000 17:39:25 +0100
From: Morten Welinder <terra@DIKU.DK>
To: BUGTRAQ@SECURITYFOCUS.COM
Subject: xterm log file vulnerability

It used to be Well Known that xterm's way of opening a log file
was insecure.  Well, that was 5+ years ago so I decided to take
a look at the current state of affairs.  Things have changed,
but mostly to "different" rather than "better".

Problem: when log files are enabled, they are created in the
following way (checking in XFree86 3.3.6 source; matches Solaris
binaries) and are subject to race conditions:

1. File is checked for existance using access.
2. If file does not exist, it is created in a subprocess using user's
   real uid/gid.  [ok]
3. File is checked for existance using access.
4. File is checked for write permission using access.
5. File is opened O_WRONLY | O_APPEND.  [plonk]

A little symlink magic between 4 and 5 and you have write access to
any file if your xterm is setuid/setgid.

General attack idea:

ls -lL `which xterm`
# If not setuid/setgid, you are safe
touch dummy
symlink-flipflop link dummy /.rhosts
xterm -l -lf link -e echo + +


Moral: access() is totally useless for security purposes.  Use it
only as a means of providing better error messages (as it might not
be easy to get an error message out from a subprocess).

Morten

----- End forwarded message -----


>How-To-Repeat:
>Fix:
>Release-Note:
>Audit-Trail:
Responsible-Changed-From-To: security-officer->tron 
Responsible-Changed-By: tron 
Responsible-Changed-When: Tue May 23 05:30:31 PDT 2000 
Responsible-Changed-Why:  
I'll will import the "xterm" from the XFree86 4.0 sources which includes 
a fix for this bug as soon as my CVS access to the XFree86 server works 
again. 
State-Changed-From-To: open->closed 
State-Changed-By: tron 
State-Changed-When: Fri May 26 00:19:41 PDT 2000 
State-Changed-Why:  
Fixed by importing XFree86 4.0 "xterm" sources. 
>Unformatted:

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